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Financial Reporting Quality, Corporate Governance, and Idiosyncratic Risk: 
Evidence from a Frontier Market 
Abstract 
We extend current literature by providing empirical evidence on the impacts of financial reporting quality 
and corporate governance mechanism - two firm-level determinants that are strongly affected by the 
unique market setting and regulatory framework in emerging/frontier markets - and idiosyncratic risk in 
Vietnam. Utilizing different panel data analysis techniques, we find high-quality financial reports can 
mitigate firm-specific risk. Firms with high state ownership tend to have lower idiosyncratic risk too, 
implying the monitoring role of the government. We also document a positive link between board size and 
firm specific risk. Our results are thus beneficial for industry regulators and firms in ensuring good 
governance and reporting framework to better manage firm risk. 
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According to standard asset pricing theory (Capital Assets Pricing Model-CAPM), the total risk 
of a stock comprises systematic risk and unsystematic risk. Systematic risk or market risk is 
governed by the market and unsystematic risk (so-called idiosyncratic risk) is firm-specific risk. 
As idiosyncratic risk can be reduced through sufficient diversification, investors are rewarded for 
bearing systematic risk only (Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Black, 1972). 
However, recent literature brings about questions to the above assumption since financial status 
or personal choice might prevent investors from holding well-diversified portfolio. Further 
research supports the questions, for example Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) who reveal that 
roughly 75 percent of investment portfolios comprising less than three stocks in the sample of 
more than 62,000 U.S. households in the period 1991-1996. Campbell et al. (2001) point out the 
extreme diversification of 50 stocks (at least) per portfolio is to spreading investment risks. 
Consequently, idiosyncratic risk should be taken into account beside systematic risk in asset 
pricing (Lehmann, 1990).  
 
Extant research also documents a surge in idiosyncratic risk (see for example, Morck, Yeung, 
and Yu, 2000) which is argued to have significant implications for portfolio management, 
investment arbitrage, and management compensation policies (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 
2011). As investors tend to expose to the idiosyncratic risk, they should be rewarded for bearing 
this type of risk too (Nguyen et al., 2019). Arbitrageurs seeking advantages in mispriced 
securities also take into consideration of idiosyncratic risk (Campbell et al., 2001). Many funds 
are also found not holding mean-variance efficient portfolios or portfolios representing the 
market portfolio to earn abnormal returns (Campbell et al., 2001; Hovey, 2015; Malkiel and Xu, 
1997; Xu and Malkiel, 2003). Given the important role of idiosyncratic risk, managers' efforts in 
managing the firm's idiosyncratic risk expand gradually from different perspectives to indirectly 
take control of the investment resources to fall into their companies.  
 
In this paper, we examine how idiosyncratic risk is influenced by financial reporting quality 
and corporate governance characteristics – two important firm-specific qualities decided at the 
discretion of management. Financial reporting quality is defined as “the precision with which 
financial reporting conveys information about the firm’s operations, in particular its expected 
cash flows, that inform equity investors” (Biddle et al., 2009). Particularly, we aim to address the 
following research question: How do financial reporting quality and corporate governance 
characteristics impact firm idiosyncratic risk?  
 
Our study is motivated by at least three main reasons. First, prior studies have provided 
evidence of corporate operation and information flow influences idiosyncratic risk and suggested 
that idiosyncratic risk can be managed by managers at some certain perspectives, namely, firm 
size (Bali et al., 2005), leverage, firm focus (Campbell et al., 2001; Dennis and Strickland, 
2004), structure of ownership  (Xu and Malkiel, 2003), firm age (Pastor and Veronesi, 2003), 
fundamentals volatility (Wei and Zhang, 2005) and earning quality (Hutton et al., 2009; 
Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 2011). However, a review of literature also shows that most 
related studies shed light on the U.S. stock market or other developed countries and there is a 
lack of research regarding firm idiosyncratic risk in emerging stock markets given their weak 
regulatory/reporting frameworks. Second, importantly, extant studies seem to solely focus on the 
link between financial reporting quality and idiosyncratic risk (see for example: Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam, 2011; Zhou et al., 2017) or between corporate governance characteristics (see 
for example: Cheng, 2008; Pathan, 2009; Adams et al., 2010, Hovey, 2015) and the risk. Our 
study is among pioneering studies that extends the current literature by examining the impact of 
both corporate governance characteristics and financial reporting quality on firm idiosyncratic 
risk. Given the significant evidence on the impact of corporate governance on idiosyncratic risk, 
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excluding it from the model could lead to a biased result. Third, as being an important frontier 
market for stock trading in Asia (Bekaert and Harvey, 2003; Vo and Phan, 2019),Vietnam's legal 
framework regarding the investment environment is yet to be fulfilled with weak information 
transparency and corporate governance (Batten and Vo, 2019). Moreover, the market is also 
characterized by daily price limits and short-selling bans which can affect stock idiosyncratic 
risk (Zhou et al., 2017). High state-ownership is also a prominent feature in Vietnam as found by 
Vo (2018)  that these firms tend to have more financial and political advantages than their non 
state-owned peers thus tend to take less risks.  Hence, we believe to find unique results on the 
influence of financial reporting quality and corporate governance characteristics on firm 
idiosyncratic risk in an important frontier market Vietnam.  
 
Employing different econometric techniques of panel data analysis, we find a significant 
negative link between financial reporting quality and firm idiosyncratic risk suggesting that 
better financial reporting quality is associated with lower firm idiosyncratic risk. Among 
corporate governance characteristics (board variables: board size, CEO duality; stock ownership 
variables: state ownership, CEO ownership), state ownership is consistently found to be 
negatively related to firm idiosyncratic risk, suggesting that high state-ownership firms tend to 
have less idiosyncratic risk. Larger board size is however associated with higher idiosyncratic 
risk. Such finding implies an important role of corporate governance in managing firm risks. The 
results are robust to different financial reporting quality measures, data analysis methods, and 
multiple endogeneity tests. We also control for several firm specific factors and find various 
relationships.  
 
The study provides empirical evidence for idiosyncratic risk determination in a new context 
and make significant contributions to prior studies. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
foremost study focusing on the effect of both financial reporting quality and corporate 
governance on firm idiosyncratic risk. We extend the work of Zhou et al., (2017) by adding two 
main dimensions of corporate governance characteristics including board variables and stock 
ownership variables (Larcker et al., 2007). Our study is the first to examine idiosyncratic risk 
and its relationship with financial reporting quality and corporate governance characteristics in 
Vietnam - an important frontier and transitional economy which we believe offers unique 
financial reporting quality and corporate governance characteristics. Vietnam market is claimed 
to have a less stringent regulatory and governance framework and high state ownership (Batten 
and Vo, 2019) compared to other developed economies. Our findings stress the importance of 
having a better reporting framework to reduce idiosyncratic risk and highlights the role of state-
ownership and board size in firm risk-taking behavior. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature, 
theories, and empirical research on the relationship between financial reporting quality, corporate 
governance characteristics, and firm idiosyncratic risk from which relevant hypotheses are 
proposed. Section 3 describes the data and method employed. Section 4 present the empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes the study. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Firm idiosyncratic risk 
The total risk of a firm’s stock comprises both systematic and unsystematic (idiosyncratic) risk. 
The idiosyncratic risk, also known as the firm specific risk, reflects the change in stock price as 
the result of the events primarily impact only on that firm and the systematic risk is more of the 
macroeconomic effects on stock price’s variance (Bansal and Clelland, 2004). Idiosyncratic 
volatility is considered as the most significant factor explaining the firm's return volatility 
(Campbell et al., 2001). Prior research documents an increase in idiosyncratic risk over time 
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(Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000) which is argued to have significant implications for portfolio 
management, investment arbitrage, and management compensation policies (Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam, 2011). Given the important role of the risk, prior research has shown various 
determinants of idiosyncratic such as leverage (Bhandari, 1988), institutional ownership, firm 
focus (Dennis and Strickland, 2004), firm size (Malkiel and Xu, 1997), financial reporting 
quality (Zhou et al., 2017)… (see related discussion in Campbell et al., 2001; Dennis and 
Strickland, 2004). In accordance with this line of research, we focus on the influence of financial 
reporting quality and corporate governance mechanism on firm idiosyncratic risk. The following 
sections discuss relevant literature from which hypotheses are proposed. 
 
2.2 Financial reporting quality and firm idiosyncratic risk 
Financial reporting quality refers “the precision with which financial reporting conveys 
information about the firm’s operations, in particular its expected cash flows, that inform equity 
investors” (Biddle et al., 2009). High-quality financial reports help reduce information 
asymmetry problem by providing timely and accurate information for investors (Zhou et al. 
2017).  Based on such information, investors are more confident and able to make sound 
investment valuation, thereby lowers the idiosyncratic risk for the stock. This is also in 
accordance with theory that noisy earnings are caused by poor earning quality (e.g., Diamond 
and Verrecchia 1991; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Easley and O’Hara 2004). Extant research has 
found empirical evidence for the negative association between reporting quality and firm 
idiosyncratic risk, suggesting that high quality information reduces the level of firm-specific risk. 
For example, Dasgupta et al. (2010) show that U.S. firms disclosing more information in a more 
transparent environment tend to have lower idiosyncratic risk. Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 
(2011) studying idiosyncratic volatility in the U.S. market from 1962 to 2001 also find that 
higher return volatility is associated with low financial reporting quality. Zhou et al.  (2017) 
report similar relationship between financial reporting quality and idiosyncratic volatility for 
Chinese listed firms (2003-2012), indicating that high quality financial information helps reduce 
firm-specific risk.  
 
 It should be noted that several studies document a positive link between financial reporting 
quality and firm idiosyncratic risk. Hutton et al. (2009) study the relationship between firm 
financial information quality and stock returns volatility for U.S. firms. By using discretionary 
accruals as opacity measurement, they show a negative relationship between opaqueness and R2 
(stock return synchronicity), suggesting lower level of informativeness can lead to lower stock 
idiosyncratic volatility. The authors explain that opaque financial reports reveal less firm specific 
information to affect its stock price, thus less idiosyncratic risk. Aman (2011) investigates how 
information quality, including management forecasts and media coverage affect firm-specific 
stock return variation in Japan, and finds that less management forecast errors and more media 
coverage are related with higher firm-specific volatility. Such inconsistent findings are found in 
developed markets using different aspects of financial reporting quality may not be applicable to 
emerging markets. As a result, informed from the relevant theories and empirical evidence 
discussed above, we expect a negative link between financial reporting quality and firm 
idiosyncratic risk (H1) 
 
H1: Financial reporting quality is negatively related to idiosyncratic risk. 
 
2.3 Corporate governance mechanism and idiosyncratic risk 
Although there have been studies investigate the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm risk (e.g., Panousi and Papanikolaou, 2012; Zhu and Yang, 2016) which is guided by 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), little research has been done regarding the 
association between corporate governance characteristics and firm idiosyncratic risk (Hovey, 
2015), especially for emerging countries (except China). The results and implications may not be 
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applied to developing markets due to differences in institutional settings (e.g., market frictions, 
governmental intervention…). Informed by Larcket et al. (2007), we focus on two main groups 
of corporate governance characteristics: board variables including board size, CEO duality and 
stock ownership variables including state ownership and CEO ownership. Empirical studies also 
show supporting evidence on the relationship between these variables and firm idiosyncratic risk. 
 
2.3.1 Board size and idiosyncratic risk 
Board of directors is to monitor the executive team and thus help address the agency problem. 
There is however little research on board size and firm idiosyncratic risk. Preliminary evidence 
on a significant relationship between risk-taking and board size was first documented in social 
psychology and organizational behavior studies. The investigation conducted by both Wallach, 
Kogan and Bem (1964) and Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) indicates the size of the firm's board 
of management negatively influences the risk-taking level. Larger board tend to better monitor 
the firm, thus can reduce risks (Hovey, 2015). However, big board can have communication 
problems and thus poor information flows (Hovey, 2015; Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992). Pham et al. (2012) find that bigger boards tend to have higher weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) suggesting high information asymmetry thus high level of risks. From the two 
strands of literature, it is not clear about the relationship between board size and idiosyncratic 
risk, we posit two competing hypotheses: 
 
H2a: Board size is negatively related to idiosyncratic risk.  
 
H2b: Board size is positively related to idiosyncratic risk. 
 
2.3.2 CEO duality and idiosyncratic risk   
Informed by Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), CEO duality is argued to upsurge 
idiosyncratic risk. Chances for the CEO to exploit own's rights to preferably working with those 
with a low tendency of disagreement or family members are very likely to happen (Westphal and 
Zajac, 1995), which can bring about a higher risk to a firm's return. CEO duality poses a positive 
relationship with firm-specific uncertainty (Alam and Ali Shah, 2013; Sun and Liu, 2014). 
Following prior research, we posit that CEO duality has a positive correlation with firm specific 
risk as follows:  
 
H3: CEO duality is positively related to idiosyncratic risk. 
 
2.3.3 State ownership and idiosyncratic risk 
Prior studies show mixed findings on the relationship between state ownership and firm risks 
across different contexts. For example, Zhu and Yang (2016) find that state-owned banks in 
China tend to take on more risks. They argue that firms believe that the financial support of the 
state (bail-out expectation) and their close relationship with the banks can secure them from 
financial problems, thus are prone to involve in risky investments (Zhu and Yang, 2016). 
However, other studies show a negative influence of state ownership on firm risk. For instance, 
Vo (2018) investigating the relationship between state ownership and firm risk-taking behavior 
for listed firms in Vietnam shows that firms with high level of state-ownership take less risks. 
State-owned firms are financially and politically supported by the government; thus, they tend to 
unfavor risky activities (Vo, 2018). These large and influential shareholders (state) are likely to 
be more conservative and try to mitigate risks (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Following that, we 
hypothesize that firms with high level of state ownership tend to have less idiosyncratic risk as 
follows.  
 
H4: State ownership is negatively related to idiosyncratic risk. 





2.3.4 CEO ownership and idiosyncratic risk 
CEO ownership is one of the important mechanisms for firms to mitigate the agency cost and 
thus can affect firm risk-taking behavior. Although little research regarding CEO ownership and 
idiosyncratic risk has been conducted, several studies have investigated the relationship between 
executives’ ownership level and firm risk. For example, Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012) show 
that high managers’ share ownership is associated with a higher level of idiosyncratic risk for 
publicly traded firms in the U.S, which can be explained by poor managerial diversification. 
Similar with state, CEO is a big and influential shareholder, thus according to Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986), they tend to be cautious and try to minimize risk. Following that, we hypothesize:   
H5: CEO ownership is negatively related to idiosyncratic risk. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Data 
Our sample includes all non-financial listed firms on Ho Chi Minh city stock exchange (HOSE) 
from 2010 to 2016 (with lagged variables are from 2009). Although established in 2000 (with 
only two listed firms), Vietnam stock market was not active until 2008-2009. Thus, we collected 
our data from 2009. Financial data are extracted from Thomson Reuter and corporation 
governance data are collected from Vietstock – a trusting local securities/stocks database (Le, 
2019). Financial institutions such as banks, insurance firms, and financial service providers are 
excluded due to their special performance and risk-taking metrics. Corporate governance data are 
not available for many firms especially in early years, unfortunately. Thus we also exclude firms 
with missing governance data. The final sample contains 707 firm-year observations. 
 
3.2 Variable measurement  
3.2.1 Idiosyncratic risk 
Following Xu and Malkiel (2003), Zhou et al. (2017) idiosyncratic volatility is measured using 
variance of idiosyncratic return.  
                                              Var ( ) = Var ( ) – Var ( )                         (1) 
Where: 
: Excess return of stock i over the risk-free rate (Vietnam government bond) 
: Excess return of market index (VNindex) over the risk-free rate  
: Idiosyncratic return 
The idiosyncratic risk, denoted as RISKID, is calculated by the square root of Var(rit) from (1). 
Yearly data are calculated using daily stock return data. 
3.2.2 Financial reporting quality 
We measure firm financial reporting quality using Rajgopal and Venkatachalam's (2011), Zhou 
et al. (2017) approach with two proxies: DD and ABACC. DD is presented by Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) and employed in many studies such as  Francis et al. (2005), Srinidhi and Gul 
(2006), and Biddle et al., (2009) and calculated by the formula: 
       =  +  + + +  +          (2) 
 Where:  
CFO: Cash flow from operation 
ΔREV: Change in revenue 
PPE: Gross value of property, plant, and equipment 
TCA: Total current accruals, which is determined based on another formula:  
TCA = ΔCA – ΔCL – ΔCASH + ΔSTD  
where:  
ΔCA: Change in current assets  
ΔCL: Change in current liabilities  
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ΔCASH: Change in cash 
ΔSTD: Change in short-term debt 
All variables are weighed by the average assets and i, t represent for firm and time, respectively. The residuals 
from (2) are used as a proxy (absolute values) for financial reporting quality (i.e., ). High values of DD 
indicate poor financial reporting quality. 
Also, following Rajgopal and Venkatachalam's (2011), Zhou et al. (2017), our second measure for financial 
reporting quality is informed from the modified Jones (1991)  model with return on assets (ROA) from Kothari et al. 
( 2005): 
                      =   (3) 
Where:  
ΔREV: Change in revenue 
ΔAR: Change in accounts receivable 
PPE: Gross value of property, plant, and equipment 
ROA: Return on assets: net income divided by average total assets 
TA: Total accruals. This variable is calculated as TA = TCA – DEPN  
of which: 
TCA: Total current accruals 
DEPN: Depreciation and amortization 
The residual (  from (3) is the abnormal accrual (ABACC), and its squared value ABACC2 is the second measure 
for financial reporting quality (Chen et al., 2011). The high value of ABACC2 also means poor financial reporting 
quality. 
3.2.3 Board and stock ownership variables 
Regarding corporate governance characteristics, informed by Larcker et al. (2007), we focus on 
two main groups of corporate governance characteristics: board variables (including board size, 
CEO duality) and stock ownership variables (including State ownership and CEO ownership). 
Board size (BSIZE) is computed by the natural logarithm of the number of board directors (Alam 
and Ali Shah, 2013). CEO duality (DUO) is measured by a dummy variable which equates to 1 if 
CEO and chairperson are the same people, and 0 otherwise (Merz and Trabert, 2017). CEO 
ownership (CEO) and State ownership (STATE) are the percentage of a firm’s shares owned by 
the CEO and the Government, respectively. 
 
3.2.4 Control variables 
Following prior studies (e.g., Wei and Zhang, 2005; Ang et al., 2009; Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam, 2011; Zhou et al., 2017), we include the following variables as control variables 
in the study: cash flows from operations (CFO), firm leverage (LEV), age (AGE), Book/Market 
ratio (BM), stock returns (RET), firm size (SIZE),  and return on assets (ROA). Particularly, 
smaller firms tend to suffer higher risk owing to its incapacity to handle risk (Brandt et al., 
2010). Stock return is found to be positively associated with idiosyncratic risk (Zhou et al., 
2017). Cashflow from operation is negatively related with volatility of stock return as firm 
profits usually link with good operation (Brown and Kapadia, 2007; Irvine and Pontiff, 2009). 
Firm leverage is positively associated with stock return volatility due to its higher vulnerability 
to financial distress (Fink et al., 2010). Age of firm and ROA are also found to lower the risk 
(Merz and Trabert, 2017). Table 1 demonstrates details of definitions and measurements of the 
variables.  
 
Table 1. Variable description 
Dependent Variable 
RISKID Idiosyncratic return volatility RISKID =  
Independent Variables  
Financial Reporting Quality 
DD  
 
High value suggests poor 
financial reporting quality 
The absolute value of the residuals of Eq. (2) 
ABACC2  
 
High value suggests poor 
financial reporting quality 
Squared values of the residuals of Eq. (3) 




BSIZE Board size  
DUA CEO Duality Dummy variable: 
If the CEO is also the chairperson, DUA=1, otherwise: 
0 
STATE State ownership Percentage of a company’s share owned by the 
government 
CEO CEO ownership Percentage of a company’s shares owned by the CEO 
Control Variables 
CFO Operating cash flows scaled by 
average total assets  
CFO_lag1 Lagged value of operating cash 
flows scaled by average total 
assets 
 
CFO_lead1 Lead value of operating cash 
flows scaled by average total 
assets 
 
SIZE Firm size: natural logarithm of 
total assets 
 
LEV Firm leverage: total debt divided 
by total assets  
BM Book value divided by market 
value of equity  
RET Annual buy-and-hold return 
 
AGE Firm age: natural logarithm of 
the number of years since listing 
 
ROA Return on assets  
 
 
3.3 Model specification 
Building on and extending Zhou et al.’s (2017) work, we examine the following regression 
models (4) and (5) with panel data analysis techniques.  
= β0 + β1 DDit-1 + β2 BSIZE it-1  + β3 DUA it-1 + β4 STATE it-1  + β5 CEO it-1  +β6 CFOit + 
β7 CFOit-1 + β8 CFOit+1 + β9 SIZE it-1  + β10 LEV it-1  + β11 RETit + β12 BM it-1  + β13 AGE it-1 + β14 
ROA it-1  + αit         (4) 
= β0 + β1 ABACC2 it-1 + β2 BSIZE it-1  + β3 DUA it-1 + β4 STATE it-1  + β5 CEO it-1  +β6 
CFOit + β7 CFOit-1 + β8 CFOit+1 + β9 SIZE it-1  + β10 LEV it-1  + β11 RETit + β12 BM it-1  + β13 AGE 
it-1 + β14 ROA it-1  + αit         (5) 
First, pooled panel data regression is run for models (4) and (5), controlling for industry 
dummies. Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test is also conducted to test for heteroskedasticity 
problems in the data. As shown later in section 4, heteroskedasticity is not a problem in our study 
(insignificant χ2 values). Then Hausman tests are conducted to choose between Random Effects 
or Fixed Effects techniques. Endogeneity tests are also employed to adress endogeneity 
problems. The next section presents our findings in detail. 
4. Results  
4.1 Descriptive analysis 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of all variables in our study. In the period of research 
2010-2016, RISKID (idiosyncratic risk) has a mean value of 0.023 and a standard deviation of 
0.007, respectively. Means and standard deviations of financial reporting quality are 0.009 and 
0.002 for DD and 0.001 and 0.0003 for ABACC2, respectively.  Regarding firm-level board 
Nguyen, Le, Tran & Dang | Financial Reporting Quality, Corporate Governance and Idiosyncratic Risk 
36 
variables, boards comprise from 3 members to 11 members with a mean of 6 members. Average 
values of State ownership and CEO ownership are 25.181% and 3.430% respectively. Table 3 
describes firm industry/sector classification. Two dominant sectors are industrials (37.62% of 
total firms) and consumer goods (28.85% of total firms). Table 4 presents the pairwise 
correlation coefficients. Idiosyncratic risk is positively correlated with DD (r=0.129, p=0.001) 
and ABACC2 (r=0.108, p=0.004), suggesting that idiosyncratic risk is negatively correlated with 
financial reporting quality (high CC/ABACC2 means poor financial reporting quality). Among 
corporate governance variables, only State ownership is negatively correlated with idiosyncratic 
risk (r=-0.169, p<0.001). Table 4 does not show any multicollinearity issues with the data. VIF 
statistics also refuse the collinearity problem (Table 5). 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
RISK_ID 0.023 0.007 0.006 0.051 
DD 0.009 0.002 0.006 0.013 
ABACC2 0.0007 0.0003 0.0004 0.0012 
BSIZE 1.740 0.208 1.099 2.398 
DUA 0.300 0.459 0.000 1.000 
STATE 25.181 23.750 0.0000 84.440 
CEO 3.430 8.318 0.0000 59.883 
SIZE 27.725 1.204 25.554 30.944 
LEV 0.261 0.191 0.000 0.758 
RET 0.050 0.514 -0.831 3.767 
AGE 1.677 0.539 0.000 2.708 
ROA 0.067 0.078 -0.717 0.677 
BM 1.796 7.803 -80.387 179.488 
CFO_lag1 0.063 0.134 -1.050 1.321 
CFO_lead1 0.066 0.137 -1.050 1.321 
CFO 0.071 0.152 -0.976 1.334 
 
Table 3: Industry classification 
Industry        Frequency Percentage 
Basic Materials 91 12.870 
Consumer Goods 204 28.850 
Consumer Services 35 4.950 
Health Care 42 5.940 
Industrials 266 37.620 
Oil & Gas 21 2.970 
Technology 13 1.840 
Telecommunications 7 0.990 
Utilities 28 3.960 
Total 707 100 
37 
 
Table 4: Correlation table 
 






RISK_ID 1.000                               
DD 0.129*** 1.000                             
ABACC2 0.108*** 0.462*** 1.000                           
BSIZE 0.057 -0.038 -0.018 1.000                         
DUA 0.031 0.013 -0.020 0.038 1.000                       
STATE 0.169*** -0.004 -0.012 -0.235*** -0.164*** 1.000                     
CEO 0.047 -0.019 0.004 0.026* 0.394*** -0.326*** 1.000                   
SIZE -0.220*** -0.063* 0.024 0.216*** -0.041 -0.001 0.069* 1.000                 
LEV 0.091** 0.019 0.024 -0.016 0.002 0.011 0.112*** 0.311*** 1.000               
RET 0.123*** -0.013 0.342*** 0.036 -0.026 0.039 -0.002 -0.016 0.011 1.000             
AGE -0.043 -0.406*** 0.132*** 0.091** -0.108*** -0.105*** -0.058 0.045 -0.099*** 0.225*** 1.000           
ROA -0.279*** 0.051 -0.066* -0.051 -0.001 0.130*** -0.067* 0.062 -0.457*** -0.084** -0.086** 1.000         
BM 0.071* -0.009 0.003 -0.020 -0.013 -0.001 0.000 -0.028 -0.038 0.063* 0.052 -0.044 1.000       
CFO_lag1 -0.050 0.106*** 0.064* 0.005 -0.012 0.149*** -0.073* -0.002 -0.191*** 0.156*** -0.064* 0.151*** 0.001 1.000     
CFO_lead1 -0.159*** -0.066* -0.064* 0.048 -0.007 0.106*** -0.072* 0.087** -0.042 -0.058 -0.036 0.191*** -0.020 0.049 1.000   
CFO -0.104*** 0.001 0.045 0.022 0.013 0.101*** -0.085** 0.044 -0.058 0.050 -0.014 0.177*** -0.089** 0.074** 0.035 1.000 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p <0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 




4.2 Regression results 
Table 6 show regression results of the relationship between financial reporting quality, corporate 
governance mechanism, and firm idiosyncratic risk. Supporting H1, we find a consistently 
negative relationship between financial reporting quality and idiosyncratic risk (positive 
coefficients of DD and ABACC2 as high DD or ABACC2 values indicate low financial reporting 
quality), suggesting that low financial reporting quality is associated with higher idiosyncratic 
risk. Our findings are consistent with Dasgupta et al. (2010), Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 
(2011), Zhou et al. (2017). The results are robust to different financial reporting quality measures 
and panel data analysis techniques. It can be explained that high-quality information in firm 
financial statements can help reduce the “surprise” in future stock prices, thus reduce 
idiosyncratic risk.  
 
Among corporate governance characteristics (Board size, CEO duality, CEO ownership, and 
State ownership), we also find a significant relationship between board size, state ownership and 
idiosyncratic risk across all 4 models. Specifically, firms with high level of state ownership tend 
to have lower idiosyncratic risk, supporting H4. Consequently, the supervision from the 
government can help reduce the firm-specific risk. Financial and political supports from the 
government can discourage managers from taking risks too (Vo, 2018). On the other hand, board 
size is found to have a positive relationship with idiosyncratic risk, supporting H2b. Firms with a 
large board size tend to have higher idiosyncratic risk, which is partly consistent with Pham et al. 
(2012) who find a positive relationship between board size and firm cost of capital. Large board 
tend to have poor communication and free-rider problems, thus can lead to more firm-specific 
risk. CEO duality and CEO ownership do not have any significant relationship with idiosyncratic 
risk. Regarding control variables, size and cash flows from operation (CFO_lead) are found to 
have a negative relationship with idiosyncratic risk across all models. Big firms and those with 
high level of CFO tend to have lower idiosyncratic risk. Firm age is also negatively associated 
with the risk (only with ABACC2 proxy). On the other hand, annual buy-and-hold returns are 
positively related to idiosyncratic volatility, suggesting firms with high firm-specific risk are 
likely to have high returns.  
 
4.3 Endogeneity tests 
To address for endogeneity issues, we have conducted several tests including change analysis 
and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions with corporate governance instrumental 
variables. First, following Zhou et al. (2017), we run a change analysis between annual change in 
firm idiosyncratic risk and annual change in financial reporting quality (annual changes in the 
two proxies: DD and ABACC2) with all the control variables (Table 7). Results show a 
consistent negative relationship between financial reporting quality and idiosyncratic risk 
(positive coefficients). We also employ 2SLS with corporate governance instrumental variables 
for two significant variables: state ownership and board size. Following Jiraporn et al. (2014), 
we use industry average of state ownership and board ownership as instrumental variables. The 
industry average values can be highly correlated with firm corporate governance characteristics 
(within the same industry) and less correlated with firm specific risk. In the first stage, industry 
average values of state ownership and board size are used to estimate firm state ownership and 
board size, respectively. The estimated values are then substituted in the main regressions to 
perform the second stage. Results (Table 8) confirm a negative relation between state ownership 
and idiosyncratic risk and a positive relation between board size and idiosyncratic risk.






Pooled Fixed Effect Pooled Random Effect 
Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
DD 0.335*** 0.006 0.412*** 0.000 
ABACC2 2.087** 0.032 2.167** 0.012 
BSIZE 0.002* 0.091 0.004* 0.057 0.002* 0.074 0.003* 0.049 
DUA -0.00001 0.991 0.0005 0.539 -0.00004 0.946 0.00011 0.863 
STATE -0.00003** 0.020 -0.00001 0.805 -0.00003** 0.012 -0.00003** 0.036 
CEO -0.00002 0.559 -0.0001 0.105 -0.00002 0.467 -0.00004 0.349 
SIZE -0.001*** 0.000 -0.002* 0.070 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
LEV 0.002 0.120 0.003 0.268 0.003 0.111 0.004* 0.064 
RET 0.002*** 0.002 0.001*** 0.003 0.001** 0.013 0.001*** 0.005 
AGE -0.001 0.225 0.001 0.342 -0.001*** 0.007 -0.001** 0.031 
ROA -0.015*** 0.000 0.001 0.852 -0.014*** 0.000 -0.006 0.141 
BM 0.00004 0.150 0.00004 0.114 0.00005 0.133 0.00005* 0.094 
CFO_lag1 -0.00017 0.928 0.00047 0.803 0.00014 0.939 0.00027 0.877 
CFO_lead1 -0.004** 0.039 -0.002 0.301 -0.004** 0.027 -0.003** 0.043 
CFO -0.002 0.264 0.001 0.503 -0.002 0.219 -0.001 0.577 
cons 0.047*** 0.000 0.064** 0.02 0.050*** 0.000 0.052*** 0.000 
Industry dummies Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.20    0.197    
F stat. 9.04***  2.62***  8.87***    
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RISKID refers to firm idiosyncratic volatility. DD and ABACC2 are two proxies of financial reporting quality. CFO 
is the operating cash flows scaled by average total assets. CFO_lag1 is the operating cash flows year scaled by 
average total assets in the previous year, and CFO_lead1 is the operating cash flows scaled by average total assets in 
the following year. BSIZE is the board size, measured as the natural logarithm of board member number. DUA is a 
dummy variable, equals one if the CEO is the chairperson and 0 otherwise. STATE refers to the percentage of state 
ownership. CEO is the percentage of shares owned by the CEO. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets.    
LEV is the firm’s financial leverage computed as the ratio of total debt to total assets. RET refers to annual buy-and-
hold return. AGE is computed as the natural logarithm of number of years since listing in HOSE. ROA is the return 
on assets, measured as the ratio of net income to total assets. BM: Book value of equity divided by market value of 
equity. 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p <0.05, *p<0.1
Wald Chi2       99.57***  
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test: Chi2 
0.49 0.485   0.32 0.569   
Hausman test for RE/FE: Chi2   32.49* 0.013   24.21 0.114 






Table 7: Change analysis of idiosyncratic risk and financial reporting quality 
Change_RISKID refers to annual changes in firm idiosyncratic volatility. Change_DD and 
Change_ABACC2 are annual changes in DD and ABACC2, respectively. CFO is the operating cash flows 
scaled by average total assets. CFO_lag1 is the operating cash flows year scaled by average total assets in 
the previous year, and CFO_lead1 is the operating cash flows scaled by average total assets in the 
following year. BSIZE is the board size, measured as the natural logarithm of board member number. 
DUA is a dummy variable, equals one if the CEO is the chairperson and 0 otherwise. STATE refers to the 
percentage of state ownership. CEO is the percentage of shares owned by the CEO. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. LEV is the firm’s financial leverage computed as the ratio of total debt to total 
assets. RET refers to annual buy-and-hold return. AGE is computed as the natural logarithm of number of 
years since listing in HOSE. ROA is the return on assets, measured as the ratio of net income to total 
assets. BM: Book value of equity divided by market value of equity. 
 









     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Change_RISKID Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
Change_DD 0.552*** 0.000 
Change_ABACC2 2.613*** 0.000 
BSIZE 0.002 0.224 0.002 0.305 
STATE -0.000005 0.733 -0.00001 0.652 
DUA 0.001 0.467 0.00043 0.544 
CEO -0.00001 0.900 0.00001 0.881 
SIZE -0.0002 0.400 -0.00017 0.539 
LEV -0.001 0.770 -0.00006 0.978 
RET 0.001 0.174 0.001** 0.021 
AGE -0.001* 0.075 0.0002 0.824 
ROA -0.010** 0.026 -0.009** 0.042 
BM 0.00002 0.590 0.00002 0.528 
CFO_lag1 0.001 0.646 0.002 0.497 
CFO_lead1 -0.001 0.807 -0.001 0.787 
CFO 0.003 0.105 0.003* 0.099 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stat 2.48*** 1.74* 
Adj. R2 0.050 0.03 





Table 8: 2SLS regression using board size and state ownership as instrumental variables 
RISKID refers firm idiosyncratic volatility. DD and ABACC2 are two proxies of financial reporting 
quality. CFO is the operating cash flows scaled by average total assets. BSIZE* is estimated in the first 
stage using board size industry average as an instrumental variable. STATE* is estimated in the first stage 
using state ownership industry average as an instrumental variable. CFO_lag1 is the operating cash flows 
year scaled by average total assets in the previous year, and CFO_lead1 is the operating cash flows scaled 
by average total assets in the following year. BSIZE is the board size, measured as the natural logarithm 
of the number of board members. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEV is the firm’s financial 
leverage computed as the ratio of total debt to total assets. RET refers to annual buy-and-hold return. 
AGE is computed as the natural logarithm of number of years since listing in HOSE. ROA is the return 
on assets, measured as the ratio of net income to total assets. BM: Book value of equity divided by market 
value of equity. 
 
RISKID Coef. P>z Coef. P>z 
DD 0.543*** 0.002     
ABACC2     1.935* 0.050 
BSIZE* 0.003* 0.061 0.003* 0.072 
STATE* -0.00004*** 0.001 -0.00004*** 0.000 
SIZE -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
LEV 0.0005 0.786 0.001 0.733 
RET 0.002*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.001 
AGE -0.002 0.015 -0.002** 0.014 
ROA -0.020*** 0.000 -0.020*** 0.000 
BM 0.00004 0.154 0.00005 0.132 
CFO_lag1 -0.002 0.457 -0.001 0.509 
CFO_lead1 -0.002 0.273 -0.002 0.27 
CFO -0.002 0.271 -0.002 0.296 
_cons 0.052*** 0.000 0.055*** 0.000 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Chi2 149.16***   142.2***   
R2 0.198   0.190   




Our study sheds more lights on idiosyncratic risk determinants by providing empirical evidence 
of significant relationships between financial reporting quality, corporate governance 
characteristics, and firm idiosyncratic risk in a new frontier market: Vietnam. Utilizing multiple 
econometric techniques of panel data analysis, we find that financial reporting quality is 
negatively linked with idiosyncratic risk, suggesting that firms that disclose more relevant and 
reflective information tend to reduce firm specific risk. State ownership is also found to 
negatively influence firm idiosyncratic risk which can be explained by better monitoring by the 
State and the low risk-taking incentives of managers given financial and political supports from 
the government (Vo, 2018). On the other hand, board size is found to be positively related to 
firm specific risk. These findings highlight the role of high-quality financial reporting framework 
and better corporate governance mechanism in managing firm-specific risk. This is highly 
applicable for emerging or frontier markets as these markets tend to have weak regulatory 
framework and governance system.  State ownership is particularly relevant for transitional 




economies in which many firms are owned by the government. Given our significant 
contributions, there are some limitations that need to be acknowledged. First, firm-level 
corporate governance variables are not widely available for Vietnamese firms, which limits our 
sample. As a result, we examine some key corporate governance characteristics that are most 
relevant to idiosyncratic risk. Further studies can extend our research to include different 
corporate governance variables, proxies for financial reporting quality as well as idiosyncratic 
risk. Future research can also use a longer period of time, compare the results under different 
market conditions, or conduct cross-market studies. 
 
REFERENCES 
Adams, R.B., Hermalin, B.E. and Weisbach, M.S., 2010, The role of boards of directors in corporate 
governance: A conceptual framework and survey, Journal of Economic Literature 48, pp. 58–107. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.48.1.58 
Alam, A. and Ali Shah, S.Z., 2013, Corporate governance and its impact on firm risk, International 
Journal of Management, Economics and Social Sciences 2, pp. 76–98. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2280479 
Aman, H., 2011, Firm-specific volatility of stock returns, the credibility of management forecasts, and 
media coverage: Evidence from Japanese firms, Japan and the World Economy 23, pp. 28–39. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.japwor.2010.06.009 
Ang, A., Hodrick, R.J., Xing, Y. and Zhang, X., 2009, High idiosyncratic volatility and low returns: 
International and further US evidence, Journal of Financial Economics 91, pp. 1–23. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.12.005 
Bali, T.G., Cakici, N., Yan, X. and Zhang, Z., 2005, Does idiosyncratic risk really matter?, The Journal of 
Finance 60, pp. 905–929. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00750.x 
Bansal, P. and Clelland, I., 2004, Talking trash: Legitimacy, impression management, and unsystematic 
risk in the context of the natural environment, Academy of Management Journal 47, pp. 93–103. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/20159562 
Batten, J. and Vo, X.V., 2019, Liquidity and firm value in an emerging market, The Singapore Economic 
Review  64, pp. 365–376. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0217590817470063 
Bekaert, G. and Harvey, C.R., 2003, Emerging markets finance, Journal of Empirical Finance, pp. 3–55. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-5398(02)00054-3 
Bhandari, L.C., 1988, Debt/equity ratio and expected common stock returns: Empirical evidence, The 
Journal of Finance 43, pp. 507–528. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb03952.x 
Biddle, G.C., Hilary, G. and Verdi, R.S., 2009, How does financial reporting quality relate to investment 
efficiency?, Journal of Accounting and Economics 48, pp. 112–131. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.09.001 
Black, F., 1972, Capital market equilibrium with restricted borrowing, The Journal of Business 45, pp. 
444–455. https://doi.org/10.1086/295472 
Brandt, M.W., Brav, A., Graham, J.R. and Kumar, A., 2010, The idiosyncratic volatility puzzle: Time 
trend or speculative episodes?, The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies 23, 
pp. 863–899. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp087 
Brown, G. and Kapadia, N., 2007, Firm-specific risk and equity market development, Journal of 
Financial Economics 84, pp. 358–388. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.03.003 
Campbell, J.Y., Lettau, M., Malkiel, B.G. and Xu, Y., 2001, Have individual stocks become more 
volatile? An empirical exploration of idiosyncratic risk, The Journal of Finance 56, pp. 1–43. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00318 




Chen, F., Hope, O.-K., Li, Q. and Wang, X., 2011, Financial reporting quality and investment efficiency 
of private firms in emerging markets, The Accounting Review 86, pp. 1255–1288. 
https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-10040 
Cheng, S., 2008, Board size and the variability of corporate performance, Journal of Financial Economics 
87, pp. 157–176. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.10.006 
Dasgupta, S., Gan, J. and Gao, N., 2010, Transparency, price informativeness, and stock return 
synchronicity: Theory and evidence, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, pp. 1189–
1220. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109010000505 
Dechow, P.M. and Dichev, I.D., 2002, The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual 
estimation errors, The Accounting Review 77, pp. 35–59. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2002.77.s-1.35 
Dennis, P. and Strickland, D., 2004, The determinants of idiosyncratic volatility, Unpublished Working 
Paper, University of Virginia.  
Diamond, D. and R. Verrecchia. 1991.  Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital.  Journal of Finance 
46, pp.1325-1360. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04620.x 
Easley, D. and M. O’Hara. 2004. Information and the cost of capital. Journal of Finance 69, pp. 1553- 
1583. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00672.x 
Fink, J., Fink, K.E., Grullon, G. and P. Weston, J., 2010, What drove the increase in idiosyncratic 
volatility during the internet boom?, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, pp. 1253–
1278. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109010000487 
Francis, J., LaFond, R., Olsson, P. and Schipper, K., 2005, The market pricing of accruals quality, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, pp. 295–327. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.06.003 
Goetzmann, W.N. and Kumar, A., 2008, Equity portfolio diversification, Review of Finance, Oxford 
University Press 12, pp. 433–463. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfn005 
Hovey, D., 2015, Idiosyncratic Risk and Corporate Governance: An Empirical Analysis of Australian 
Listed Firms, Thesis. Griffith Business School. 
Hutton, A.P., Marcus, A.J. and Tehranian, H., 2009, Opaque financial reports, R2, and crash risk, Journal 
of Financial Economics 94, pp. 67–86. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.10.003 
Irvine, P.J. and Pontiff, J., 2009, Idiosyncratic return volatility, cash flows, and product market 
competition, The Review of Financial Studies 22, pp. 1149–1177. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn039 
Jensen, M.C., 1993, The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems, 
The Journal of Finance 48, pp. 831–880. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x 
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H., 1976, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, pp. 305-360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-
405X(76)90026-X 
Jin, L. and Myers, S.C., 2006, R2 around the world: New theory and new tests, Journal of Financial 
Economics 79, pp. 257–292. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.11.003 
Jiraporn, P., Jiraporn, N., Boeprasert, A. and Chang, K., 2014, Does corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
improve credit ratings? Evidence from geographic identification, Financial Management 43, pp. 
505–531. https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12044 
Jones, J.J., 1991, Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations, Journal of Accounting 
Research 29, pp. 192-228. https://doi.org/10.2307/2491047 
Kothari, S.P., Leone, A.J. and Wasley, C.E., 2005, Performance matched discretionary accrual measures, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, pp. 163–197. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.11.002 




Larcker, D.F., Richardson, S.A. and Tuna, I. rem., 2007, Corporate governance, accounting outcomes, 
and organizational performance, The Accounting Review. 82, pp. 963–1008. 
https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2007.82.4.963 
Le, T.N.D. (2019). Financial reporting quality, corporate governance, and idiosyncratic volatility: 
evidence from Vietnam. Thesis. International University, VNU HCMC, Vietnam. 
Lehmann, B.N., 1990, Residual risk revisited, Journal of Econometrics 45, pp. 71–97. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(90)90094-A 
Leuz, C. and R. Verrecchia. 2000. Economic consequences of increased disclosure.  Journal of 
Accounting Research 38, pp. 91-124. https://doi.org/10.2307/2672910  
Lintner, J., 1965, The Valuation of Risky Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock 
Portfolios and Capital Budgets. Review of Economics and Statistics, 47, 13-37,  Journal of 
Economic Theory 69, pp. 532–539. https://doi.org/10.2307/1924119  
Lipton, M. and Lorsch, J.W., 1992, A modest proposal for improved corporate governance, The Business 
Lawyer , pp. 59–77.  
Malkiel, B.G. and Xu, Y., 1997, Risk and return revisited, Journal of Portfolio Management 23, p. 9. 
https://doi.org/10.3905/jpm.1997.409608 
Markowitz, H., 1952, Portfolio selection, Journal of Finance 7, pp. 77-91. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
6261.1952.tb01525.x 
Merz, A. and Trabert, S., 2017, Corporate governance and the volatility of volatility. 
Morck, R., Yeung, B. and Yu, W., 2000, The information content of stock markets: why do emerging 
markets have synchronous stock price movements?, Journal of Financial Economics 58, pp. 215–
260. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00071-4 
Moscovici, S. and Zavalloni, M., 1969, The group as a polarizer of attitudes, Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 12, p. 125. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0027568 
Nguyen, P., Zaied, Y. Ben and Pham, T.P., 2019, Does idiosyncratic risk matter? Evidence from mergers 
and acquisitions, The Journal of Risk Finance 20, pp.313-329. https://doi.org/10.1108/JRF-03-2018-
0040 
Panousi, V. and Papanikolaou, D., 2012, Investment, idiosyncratic risk, and ownership, The Journal of 
Finance 67, pp. 1113–1148. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01743.x 
Pastor, L. and Veronesi, P., 2003, Stock Prices and IPO Waves, No 4002, CEPR Discussion Papers, 
C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. https://doi.org/10.3386/w9858 
Pathan, S., 2009, Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking, Journal of Banking & Finance 3, pp. 
1340–1350. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.02.001 
Pham, P.K., Suchard, J. and Zein, J., 2012, Corporate governance and the cost of capital: Evidence from 
Australian companies, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 24, pp. 84–93. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2012.00392.x 
Rajgopal, S. and Venkatachalam, M., 2011, Financial reporting quality and idiosyncratic return volatility, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 51, pp. 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.06.001 
Sharpe, W.F., 1964, Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium under conditions of risk, The 
Journal of Finance 19, pp. 425–442. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1964.tb02865.x 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., 1986, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal of Political 
Economy 94, pp. 461-488. https://doi.org/10.1086/261385 
Srinidhi, B. and Gul, F.A., 2006, The differential effects of auditors’ non-audit and audit fees on accrual 
quality, Contemporary Accounting Research 24, pp.595-629. https://doi.org/10.1506/ARJ4-20P3-





Sun, J. and Liu, G., 2014, Audit committees’ oversight of bank risk-taking”, Journal of Banking & 
Finance. 40, pp. 376–387. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.12.015 
Vo, X.V., 2018, Do firms with state ownership in transitional economies take more risk? Evidence from 
Vietnam, Research in International Business and Finance 46, pp. 251–256. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2018.03.002 
Vo, X.V. and Phan, D.B.A., 2019, Herding and equity market liquidity in emerging market. Evidence 
from Vietnam, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance 24, 100189. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2019.02.002 
Wallach, M.A., Kogan, N. and Bem, D.J., 1964, Diffusion of responsibility and level of risk taking in 
groups., The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 68, p. 263. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/h0042190 
Wei, S.X. and Zhang, C., 2005, Idiosyncratic risk does not matter: A re-examination of the relationship 
between average returns and average volatilities, Journal of Banking & Finance 29, pp. 603–621. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(04)00050-0 
Westphal, J.D. and Zajac, E.J., 1995, Who shall govern? CEO/board power, demographic similarity, and 
new director selection, Administrative Science Quarterly, pp. 60–83. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2393700 
Xu, Y. and Malkiel, B.G, 2003, Investigating the behavior of idiosyncratic volatility, The Journal of 
Business 76, pp. 613–645. https://doi.org/10.1086/377033 
Zhou, T., Xie, J. and Li, X., 2017, Financial reporting quality and idiosyncratic return volatility: Evidence 
from China, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade  53, pp. 835–847. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2016.1142200 
Zhu, W. and Yang, J., 2016, State ownership, cross-border acquisition, and risk-taking: Evidence from 
China’s banking industry, Journal of Banking & Finance 71, pp. 133–153. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2016.05.004 
 
 
 
